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Abstract 
Interdependency associated with a system failure of lifeline networks is evaluated in views of a seismic hazard. We 
select electric power supply systems, gas supply systems, and water supply systems distributed in Tokyo metropolitan 
area for analysis, and these related facilities and structural components are modeled as network nodes and links 
taking into account their functional interdependency. To reveal the trend of network system reliability and analyze its 
variation, numerical simulation by using network parameters of average degree k , characteristic path length L ,
clustering coefficient C , relative size of the largest cluster S , average size of the isolated clusters s  and 
accessibility ratio aR , is carried out for the cases that the nodes exposed to a high seismic hazard are affected in 
entire interactive lifeline networks. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Societal and economical activity in a mega city depends on the function of lifeline networks (LLNs) such 
as electrical power supply systems (EPSSs), gas supply systems (GSSs), water supply systems (WSSs) 
and so forth. In recent years, an issue on interdependency associated with physical and functional damage 
of LLNs during a catastrophic natural disaster due to an earthquake and a tsunami in a mega city, is 
focused on in the related research field. The interdependency consists of three factors: interaction of 
physical damage in LLNs, interaction of the functional damage, and conflict in the restoration process for 
LLNs (Nojima and Kameda 1995). The issue occurred in the recent earthquakes such as the 1995 Kobe 
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earthquake (Hada and Meguro 2000). The occurrence of the issue is feared in the anticipated Tokai, 
Nankai, and Tonankai earthquakes and Tokyo metropolitan earthquake which have high seismic hazards 
in Japan.  
In terms of the issue on interdependency of the damage of LLNs in views of a seismic hazard, Nojima 
and Kameda (1995) show the framework to evaluate the related risk of seismic damage of LLNs 
including interaction of the damage. Javanbarg and Takada (2009) show results on evaluation of 
reliability of WSSs considering the effect of an electric blackout. From other different approach, system 
reliability of various physical and social networks is discussed based on network theory.  
Albert et al. (2000) introduce parameters to quantify network characteristics and behavior, and analyze 
tolerant capability of massive networks. Park et al. (2006) evaluate behavior of typical huge complex air 
and road networks by using above parameters. However, there seems to be no established framework to 
evaluate system reliability of LLNs considering interdependency on their damage. Few case studies for 
LLNs in a mega city in views of a seismic hazard have not been carried out. On the basis of these reasons, 
we develop the framework to evaluate system reliability of an interactive LLN with EPSSs, GSSs and 
WSSs, and the related case study is carried out. 
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Figure 1: Framework on evaluation of system reliability of interactive LLNs. 
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Networks
No. of
nodes
No. of
links
<k> L C
No. of
affected
nodes
Rate of
affected
nodes
Power 169 242 2.864 6.749 0.110 19 11.2%
Gas 681 974 2.860 18.660 0.099 132 19.4%
Water 198 287 2.899 10.036 0.100 29 14.6%
2. Framework ON evaluation of system reliability OF lNNS 
Figure 1 shows the framework to evaluate system reliability of subject entire interactive LLNs. First of all, 
we model facilities and structural components as nodes, and related cables and pipelines as links. We 
select a source node (SN) and a terminal node (TN) from these nodes on interdependency of the damage 
of subject LLNs. The nodes which functions are crucial and related to operate other LLNs, are defined as 
SNs and the nodes of other LNNs related functionally with the SNs, are defined as TNs. Secondly, a node 
exposed by a high seismic hazard is defined as a failure node (FN) in  interactive LLNs and the order of a 
failure of FNs is set by a random sampling. We introduce network parameters defined in chapter 3 to 
evaluate system reliability of the LLNs. According to the order of a failure of FNs, a FN is removed each 
by each from the LNNs, and the variation of values of network parameters is simulated. During a certain 
removal, when a SN is removed from the LNNs, the related TNs are removed dependently although the 
TNs do not correspond with FNs. A series of above trials is repeated for N times. 
3. METHOD OF NUMERICAL TRIALS
3.1. Modeling of subject LLNs 
We combine EPSSs, GSSs and WSSs located the Tokyo metropolitan area as subject interactive LLNs. In 
modeling EPSSs, power stations, substations, switching stations, frequency transform stations and points 
where transmission lines intersect are idealized as nodes, and related cables and pipelines as links. In 
modeling GSSs, production factories, GS, BS/VS/BVS, stable pressure plants and points where gas 
pipelines intersect are idealized as nodes, and related pipelines as links. In modeling WSSs, purification 
plants, water reservoirs, pump stations, distribution stations and points where water pipelines intersect are 
idealized as nodes, and related pipelines as links. Table 1 shows the characteristics of subject LLNs, 
initial values of network parameters as described in the following sub-section, and the number of FNs. 
When modeling the LLNs, websites and reports published by the related lifeline companies and sectors 
(Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc 2009; Tokyo Gas Company, Ltd 2009; Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government Bureau of Waterworks 2009; The Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s Disaster Prevention 
Information 2009) are referred, and we refine the network models based on interviews for the companies 
and sectors. 
Table 1: Characteristics of subject LNNs
3.2. Network parameters 
We use network parameters as indices to measure the characteristics of interactive LNNs by referring and 
modifying the approach by Albert et al. (2000). First, by using degree ik on node i , which is the number 
of nodes connected to node i , average degree k  are expressed as follows;
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where n  is total number of nodes in LNNs. k  quantifies the average connectivity of a node to the 
neighboring nodes. Next, characteristic path length il on node i  and characteristic path length L on
LLNs are expressed as follow;
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where pin  is the number of pairs with node i  and ijd  is the shortest path length from node i  to another 
j th-paired node. il  quantifies the average of shortest path lengths between any two nodes on node i  and 
in a similar way L  quantifies that on LLNs. Third, clustering coefficient ic  on node i  and C  on LLNs 
are expressed as follow; 
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where 2Cik  is the number of pairs by any nodes neighboring on node i  and 
p
nin ,  is the number of pairs 
with actually interconnected links in the pairs selected from the combination of 2Cik . ic  is the rate of 
connection in the neighboring nodes on node i . C  is the average of ic  in LLNs and quantifies the 
amount of fragmentation on subject LNNs. ik , il , ic , k , L  and C  are fundamental network 
parameters which describe the characteristics of LNNs under their topologies. From Table 1, the values of 
k  and C  on subject LLNs are almost same as 2.9 and 0.1. The other hand, the value of L  becomes 
larger when the size of LNNs becomes larger; 6.75 on EPSSs, 18.66 on GSSs and 10.04 on WSSs. 
In addition, in order to quantify the variation associated with network characteristics when network 
topology varying from initial one due to a random failure of high-seismic-hazard nodes, relative size of 
the largest cluster S  and average size of the isolated clusters s  are computed as follow; 
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where aftCl  is the number of nodes contained in a largest cluster (size of the largest cluster) on  LNNs 
after high-seismic-hazard nodes are removed (affected networks) and iniCl  is the size of the largest 
cluster on initial LNNs before removals of high-seismic-hazard nodes (initial networks). cn  is the 
number of clusters except the largest cluster and mCl  is the number of nodes contained in cluster m
except the largest cluster (size of cluster m ). S  is the rate of connectivity on affected networks 
compared with that on initial networks and s  shows the connectivity of nodes except the largest cluster. 
Lastly, accessibility ratio aR  is expressed as follows; 
p
ini
p
aft
a
n
n
R                                                                                                                                                    (5) 
where 
p
aftn  is the number of pairs by any accessible nodes of affected networks, and 
p
inin  is that of initial 
networks. aR  quantifies the redundancy of LLNs when some of their nodes are affected due to a random 
removal of high-seismic-hazard nodes. 
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3.3. Anticipated seismic hazard and computational method 
To decide the FNs in subject interactive LNNs, we use the probability of occurrences exceeding seismic 
intensity of 6 lower in anticipated 30 years from January 1st , 2007 by courtesy of J-SHIS (2009). Table 1 
shows the number of FNs for LNNs; 19 nodes in EPSSs, 132 nodes in GSSs and 29 nodes for WSSs. 
Here, K  is defined as the rate of the number of removed FNs failn  with the number of FNs in initial 
networks inin . Table 1 shows the values of K  when all FNs are removed; 11.2% in EPSSs, 19.4% in 
GSSs and 14.6% in WSSs. With removals of FNs in a random failure, the numerical trials are repeated for 
100 times. 
3.4.Interactive LNNs
We model interactive LLNs by the method so that TNs functionally connected by a SN are removed 
simultaneously when a failure of a SN occurs. Nodes on 275kV electric power substations in EPSSs are 
defined as SNs, and nodes on functionally connected facilities of GSSs and WSSs with the SNs are 
defined as TNs. To put it more concretely, facilities such as production factories, GS, BS/VS/BVS, stable 
pressure plants in GSSs and purification plants, water reservoirs, pump stations, water distribution 
stations in WSSs are modeled as TNs. We give the constraint that a TN is located in 10-kilometer-radius 
area from the nearest SN. In interactive LNNs, there are 43 SNs, and 129 TNs between EPSSs and GSSs 
and 80 TNs between EPSSs and WSSs. 7 SNs in 43 SNs are selected as FNs, and TNs related with FNs 
are 17 nodes on GSSs and 8 nodes on WSSs. 
4.Evaluation OF system reliability of interactive lnnS
Figure 2 shows trends of the values of network parameters for the interactive LNNs in the case of the 
increase of FNs. It also shows the curves at the failure order in the case that S  on WSSs shows lower 
limit (WSS influenced order), as shown by boldfaced lines in Figure 2. Black points on boldfaced lines 
are removal TNs when the corresponding SN is removed. Based on results of Figure 2, mean and 
coefficient of variation (cov) of network parameters for 100 independent numerical trials are computed as 
shown in Figure 3. 
From Figure 2, we analyze the trends of network parameters in the case of WSS influenced order. 
Behavior of the parameters on EPSSs considering interdependency effect is similar to that on independent 
EPSSs since TNs do not exist in EPSSs in the interactive LNNs and it does not receive the interaction 
from GSSs and WSSs. To the contrary, removals of SNs in EPSSs impact behavior of GSSs and WSSs at 
the timing of SNs’ removal.  
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Figure 2: Variation of network parameters. 
Significant segmentation of GSSs occurs at 131st-node removal which is the case that a high-seismic-
hazard SN in EPSSs is removed and the TNs of functionally interconnected GSSs are removed 
simultaneously. This GSS segmentation at 131st-node removal occurs more lately at the time of the 
failure after the WSSs failure at 35th-node removal ( 05.0|K ) and the induced WSS segmentation at 
43rd-node removal ( 056.0|K ) occur. It means that the segmentation geographically occurs in the 
border between Tokyo, Saitama and Chiba prefectures.  
The trends of k , L  and C  on WSSs are similar to those on independent WSSs. The decrement S'
and aR'  of S  and aR  on WSSs at the 35th-node removal become large compared with decrements at 
other removals before and after the 35-node removal. s  on WSSs does not change drastically at the 
same time. In this time, 2 nodes on WSSs are removed due to interdependency effect on the SN in EPSSs. 
It means the occurrence of functional damage on WSSs after 8 FNs on WSSs have been removed. The 2-
node removal causes the isolation of the remained nodes for WSSs. The value of s  stays stable at the 
time compared with those of S  and aR  since the increase of the isolated nodes for WSSs occurs. At the 
35th-node removal, the minor segmentation of WSSs occurs near Adachi Ward in Tokyo. In the 
following failure, at the 43rd-node removal the major segmentation of WSSs occurs although the removal 
does not related with interdependency effect. Hence the values of S  and aR  decrease significantly at the 
time. In other words the 35th-node removal due to interdependency effect induces and accelerates the 
major segmentation at the 43rd-node removal. It means that the segmentation occurs when the nodes 
located in the east area of Tokyo around Sumida, Katsushika, Edogawa and Koto Wards are affected.  
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Figure 3: Mean and cov of network parameters (solid curve denotes mean and dotted curve denotes cov). 
From Figure 3, covs of k  and L  on EPSSs are small and mean of C  on EPSSs increases 
monotonically when the number of affected nodes increases. The reason is that the nodes which degrees 
on node i ik  become low are removed in the interactive LNNs. EPSSs have a main circular network and 
many removal nodes on the edge located in the network. These nodes at the edge are geographically 
located around Tokyo Bay. Mean values of S and aR  decrease gradually with the increase of the 
number of affected nodes, and cov of s  is small. It indicates that large fragmentation on EPSSs does 
not occur. 
The values of network parameters on GSSs show wide variation when the number of affected nodes 
increases. Mean of k  decreases monotonically with the increase of affected nodes, but its cov is small. 
There is little influence on the trend of the reduction in spite of any orders of a failure. In contrast, the 
means of L , S  and aR  decrease largely and their covs show the maximum values at 126th- and 121st-
node removals. Cov of s  shows the peak value at 121st-node removal. It is clear that large 
segmentation of the interactive LNNs occurs at this time. Focusing on L , its cov reaches a peak value 
firstly at 18th-node removal, and its mean shows a maximum value at 77th-node removal. GSSs are dense 
in the central part of the interactive LNNs which is located in the area near the border between Tokyo and 
Saitama prefecture. Consequently, once removals of FNs located in above area occur intensively, increase 
of the value of L  is observed. 
Variations of L , S , s  and aR  on WSSs are larger slightly than those on EPSSs, but smaller than 
those on GSSs. It indicates that large segmentation of WSSs does not occur as well as EPSSs. Means of 
k  and C  on WSSs show minimum values at 114th- and 123rd-node removals. WSSs are located from 
the east to west side in Tokyo metropolitan area, and most of affected nodes are located in the east side. 
In terms of a failure of WSSs, nodes located in the area, which values on ik  have already decreased, are 
removed in turn.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We develop the framework to evaluate system reliability of lifeline networks (LLNs) with electric power 
supply systems (EPSSs), gas supply systems (GSSs) and water supply systems (WSSs) considering 
interdependency of the damage of subject interactive LLNs and show the case studies on evaluation of 
system reliability for the interactive LLNs located in Tokyo metropolitan area subjected to a high seismic 
hazard. As a result, we can evaluate properly the variation of network characteristics and behavior under 
the condition that high-seismic-hazard nodes functionally interconnected between EPSSs, GSSs, and 
WSSs are affected due a random failure by using network parameters which describe the connectivity, 
fragmentation and segmentation for entire interactive LNNs. 
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